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When states are attempting to recover from periods of serious human rights abuse, they
often must try to reconcile the competing demands of different stakeholders. These
demands may range from claims that complete impunity is a necessary sacrifice to
achieve peace, to the belief that without justice no meaningful peace can be reached. This
paper will attempt to highlight the ways in which international courts and quasi-judicial
bodies address the dilemma of peace versus justice, in relation to amnesty laws. The dis-
cussion will consider the main international standards on impunity, the international
jurisprudence relating to amnesties and whether international courts should recognize
amnesties that are accompanied by alternative forms of justice. This paper will argue that
international courts should recognize amnesties that are introduced with democratic
approval to promote peace and reconciliation, provided that they are accompanied by
mechanisms to fulfil the victims’ rights.
Introduction
Since the early 1990s, advocates of international justice have increasingly
described measures such as the establishment of international and hybrid tri-
bunals to address serious human rights violations as crucial for the reestablish-
ment of the rule of law and the promotion of reconciliation within states that have
been torn apart by violence and criminality.2 This position is disputed by propo-
nents of amnesties, including politicians, diplomats, academics and some sectors
of civil society, who contend that formal international prosecutions may be
unlikely to contribute to reconciliation between previously antagonistic groups,
whereas amnesties might help to reduce the violence and create a climate in which
moves towards reconciliation could be pursued.
The arguments in favor of amnesty in transitional states usually contend that
peace could never be achieved without some form of amnesty, as combatants
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would be unlikely to surrender their weapons and dictators would be unwilling to
transfer power to democrats.3 Furthermore, academics have argued that if, after a
war, the victors impose conditions that ‘involve crushing the dignity of the van-
quished, the peace will not last,’4 perhaps because, as Hadden contends, ‘strict
punishment of all violators may serve to maintain rather than reconcile the dif-
fering recollections and attitudes of the various communal or political groups
from which the conflict arose.’5 The position is particularly delicate where there is
no clear victor in a conflict, and little international intervention either to end the
violence or to establish justice mechanisms. In such circumstances, any political
settlement has to be a compromise between the different parties, as an attempt by
one side to punish its opponents could reignite the violence.6 Instead, it has been
suggested that it is better ‘to quell the need for vengeance’ among those who have
been defeated by implementing policies of compromise and forgiveness.7 Being
merciful to former enemies whilst attempting to address the root causes of the
conflict could reduce the justification for further violence, promote the develop-
ment of the conditions for reconciliation and strengthen the establishment of
human rights institutions.
These arguments in favor of amnesties appear to be borne out in state practice.
Based on the Amnesty Law Database,8 created by the author, which contains data
on amnesties granted in all parts of the world since the end of World War Two, it
appears that over 420 amnesty processes have been introduced during this period,














































Fig. 1 Amnesties by year. Source: Amnesty Law Database.
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over 66 amnesties were introduced between January 2001 and December 2005.
The distribution of amnesty processes over time can be seen in Figure 1. This
shows that amnesties have continued to be a political reality despite international
efforts to combat impunity. For this reason, this paper will argue that internation-
al courts should focus their limited prosecutorial resources on combating the
most egregious forms of impunity and recognize amnesties that are introduced
with democratic approval to promote peace and reconciliation if these are accom-
panied by mechanisms to fulfil victims’ rights.
This paper will begin by analyzing the international legal principles to combat
impunity; namely, the rights to a remedy, truth, justice and reparations, before
examining the case law of international courts on amnesties. Finally, the paper will
consider whether international courts can recognize amnesties that are accompa-
nied by alternative forms of justice, such as truth commissions, community-based
justice systems and reparations. The validity of amnesties that have democratic
approval or that allow selective prosecutions of those who are ‘most responsible’
will also be considered.
International Legal Principles to Combat Impunity
When considering the attitudes of the international courts and quasi-judicial
bodies to amnesties, a distinction should be drawn between institutions whose
jurisdiction applies to individuals and those whose jurisdiction applies to states.
The courts that hold individuals accountable – namely the ad hoc and hybrid 
tribunals – and the International Criminal Court (ICC) consider whether per-
petrators are entitled to use amnesties to shield themselves from prosecution. In
contrast, the regional and universal human rights mechanisms that hold states
accountable consider whether states have violated their obligations under inter-
national law by introducing amnesties, which is possible even where amnesties
are valid under national law. The obligations that states are most likely to have
violated include the duties to guarantee the victims’ rights to a remedy, truth,
justice and reparations. This denial of rights can potentially aggravate the suf-
fering of victims in many ways including continuing their sense of alienation
from society and inhibiting their ability to access state services and obtain com-
pensation.9 Amnesty for lower-level offenders could also mean that in their daily
life, victims are frequently confronted by the individuals who caused their suf-
fering, which could cause further harm to the victims and even lead them to
engage in vigilantism.10 However, it will be argued below that individualized,
conditional amnesties in conjunction with other transitional justice mecha-
nisms can, if well designed, actually contribute to guaranteeing each of the vic-
tims’ rights.
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Right to a Remedy
The right to a remedy is a composite right that is contained in the general human
rights treaties11 and has been recognized in the jurisprudence of the international
courts.12 The key elements have been defined in the United Nations’ Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy as consisting of the victims’
rights to ‘equal and effective access to justice,’ ‘adequate, effective and prompt
reparation for harm suffered’ and ‘access to relevant information concerning vio-
lations and reparation mechanisms.’13 States must fulfill each of these elements to
avoid breaching victims’ right to a remedy. The rights to truth and reparations will
be dealt with later in the article, and the remainder of this section will consider
victims’ right to access justice.
This right was described in the Basic Principles and Guidelines as the right of a vic-
tim of ‘a gross violation of human rights law or of a serious violation of interna-
tional humanitarian law’ (i.e., not explicitly limited to victims of international
crimes) to have ‘equal access to an effective judicial remedy as provided for under
international law.’ The Basic Principles and Guidelines continue, however, that ‘other
remedies available to the victim include access to administrative and other bodies, as
well as mechanisms, modalities and proceedings conducted in accordance with
domestic law.’14 However, the Basic Principles and Guidelines also stipulate that:
In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, States
have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to
prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the
duty to punish her or him.15
The emphasis here appears to be on judicial remedies, although it is recognized
that other forms of recourse for crimes, which do not meet the threshold of inter-
national crimes could be acceptable. This distinction is significant because, as will
be seen below, many crimes that occur during wars or dictatorships may not reach
this threshold.
The recognition of other acceptable forms of recourse is also supported by
Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, relating to the principle of complementari-
ty,16 which provides that ‘the Court should find a case inadmissible where ... the
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case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it.’17
This permits the ICC to intervene only where the territorial state is unwilling or
unable to genuinely either investigate or prosecute a case. It seems clear that under
this article, a blanket amnesty that was designed to prevent the facts becoming
known would be taken as evidence of a state’s unwillingness to investigate.
However, individualized conditional amnesties that provide for investigations and
reparations may be viewed more leniently. This more flexible approach is 
reflected in Article 17(1)(b) which provides that the ICC should declare a case
inadmissible where:
the case has been investigated by a state which has jurisdiction over it and the state has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the state genuinely to prosecute.18
Robinson interprets this provision as applying to cases such as the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) where prosecution remained pos-
sible for all amnesty applicants, unless the Amnesty Committee decided that it
had complied with the conditions outlined in the 1995 Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act.19 According to this Act, the amnesty did not aim to
shield individuals from prosecution, but rather to assist with effective truth
recovery, and it could therefore potentially be used by the ICC as evidence of
domestic investigations, which offer a remedy to victims and to which the ICC
prosecutor should defer.
Right to Truth and the Duty to Investigate
The right to truth is not explicitly referred to in the general human rights instru-
ments or subject-specific conventions, with the possible exception of the right of
every individual to ‘receive information’ contained in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights.20 Despite this, Hayner asserts that within the duty of
states to investigate and punish violations of human rights ‘is the inherent right of
the citizenry to know the results of such investigations.’21 This view is articulated
in the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
through Action to Combat Impunity:
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Irrespective of any legal proceedings, victims and their families have the impre-
scriptible right to know the truth about the circumstances in which violations took
place and, in the event of death or disappearance, the victim’s fate.22
This formulation does not appear to distinguish international crimes from
human rights violations that do not reach that threshold. The Updated Set of
Principles further asserts that society has:
the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration
of heinous crimes and about circumstances and reasons which led, through massive or
systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes.23
This formulation reflects the approach taken by the European Court of Human
Rights24 and the Inter-American Court.25 The Updated Set of Principles also high-
lights commissions of inquiry and the preservation of archives as means of ensur-
ing the right to truth.26
In relation to amnesties, commissions of inquiry are usually required to investi-
gate the crimes committed by the individuals applying for amnesty. In some
instances, these investigations are limited and merely seek to establish that the
individuals have not perpetrated any crimes that are excluded from the terms of
the amnesty. In other instances, usually in truth commissions, the individuals
could be required to make a full disclosure of all crimes they have committed
before being granted amnesty and failure to cooperate fully with the commission
could result in the amnesty being withheld and the applicants possibly facing
criminal prosecution. The limited investigations do little to ensure the right to
truth,27 but granting amnesty in exchange for truth can result in the victims and
society gaining credible information about the events that occurred during the
period of violence.28
Duty to Prosecute and Punish
Since World War Two, the international community has elaborated treaties to pro-
hibit and penalize certain international crimes including genocide, grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions and torture. These treaties place obligations on states
to prosecute or extradite individuals suspected of perpetrating the crimes that
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they prohibit. However, these treaties do not always apply to situations of wide-
spread violence. For example, international humanitarian law does not impose an
obligation to prosecute crimes committed during internal conflicts. This means
that most conflicts since World War Two have not given rise to an obligation to
prosecute under international humanitarian law. Similarly, the definition of geno-
cide in the 1948 Genocide Convention excludes the ‘extermination of a group on
political grounds,’29 which excludes situations such as the South American ‘dirty
wars’ where large numbers of people were killed for their supposed political
beliefs.
In addition to the international crimes prohibited under treaty law, it can be
argued that there is a developing obligation to prosecute crimes against humanity
under customary international law, as reflected by the codification of crimes
against humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute. However, states continue to
introduce amnesties for international crimes, including crimes against humanity.
The Amnesty Law Database shows that since the UN changed its approach to
amnesty laws with the signing of the Lomé Accord on 7 July 1999,30 29 amnesty
laws have excluded some form of international crimes and 24 amnesty laws have
granted immunity from criminal prosecution for such crimes. Consequently, it is
too early to suggest that an international legal custom relating to the prosecution
of international crimes is developing, and it cannot yet be said that the customary
duty to prosecute crimes against humanity is mandatory. Furthermore, for much
of the period since the Nuremberg judgments, ‘crimes against humanity’ have
been understood to require a nexus to armed conflict. Although the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has moved away from this
position and delegates to the Rome Conference declined to include it in the ICC
Statute,31 this nexus may still apply for crimes against humanity committed dur-
ing much of the post-war period.
The duty to prosecute under international law therefore does not appear to pre-
clude amnesties for all serious human rights abuses as treaty law is not extensive
enough to cover all situations, and the duty to prosecute crimes against humanity
under customary international law is not yet clearly established. Furthermore,
where there is a clear duty to prosecute (for example, for individuals who commit
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) a state may not be required to prose-
cute every perpetrator, as this would not be a realistic obligation. Therefore, as will
be explored below, approaches that couple selective prosecutions for the ‘most
responsible’ with amnesty for lower-level offenders may be permissible, if these
approaches are accompanied by mechanisms to ensure the rights of the victims.
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Right to Reparation
The right to reparation is not specifically addressed under existing international
human rights conventions, although all the main instruments affirm a ‘right to a
remedy,’ which can be understood to provide inter alia a right to reparations for harm
suffered. The importance of the right to reparation has been supported in the deci-
sions of the international courts,32 and it has been recognized in Rule 106 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence of ad hoc tribunals and Article 75 of the Rome Statute.
Reparations can be related to amnesty laws in several ways. Firstly, amnesties
can provide reparations to individuals who have been penalized or imprisoned for
their alleged political or religious beliefs. Amnesties that are granted to restore the
dignity and status of those who have been oppressed, and to clear their criminal
record, are not problematic under international law. In contrast, when amnesties
are issued to perpetrators of human rights violations, the amnesty itself can vio-
late victims’ human rights, and should then be remedied. For example, amnesties
can prevent victims obtaining reparation for the suffering they endured by pro-
hibiting civil proceedings or by making investigations too difficult to enable such
proceedings to succeed. An appropriate reparations package could therefore
include repealing the law in question. Amnesties could include provisions on
reparations or could be accompanied by legislation to provide financial compen-
sation for victims and their families, facilitate the victims’ right to file a civil suit,
uncover the truth about the violations, memorialize the suffering of the victims
and prevent such violations re-occurring.
Response of International Courts and Quasi-judicial
Bodies to Amnesty Laws
The response of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies to amnesty laws
has differed between regions, with the Inter-American system providing the most
active consideration. This began with the Inter-American Court in the Velásquez
Rodríguez case, relating to enforced disappearance in Honduras, which established
an important principle that has been cited in subsequent judgments on amnesty
laws by the Inter-American Court and Commission. In its ruling, the court
declared that the state must:
use the means at its disposal to carry out investigations of violations committed with-
in its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, impose appropriate punishment and
ensure the victim adequate compensation.33
However, these succinct descriptions of the nature of a state’s obligations do not
provide much detail on the scope of these rights. For example, in the case of dis-
appearances, does the duty to investigate entitle the victim’s family to discover that
their relative was killed by state forces? Do family members have the right to learn
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about the victim’s final moments? Do they have the right to learn the names of
those responsible? Finally, do they have the right to have the remains returned? If
it was decided that the right to truth covered all these elements, fulfilling them
could prove problematic where there are mass graves and only limited resources
available for exhuming and identifying the victims. In most instances, the courts
have held that the right to truth requires that victims receive an explanation of
why the events that caused their suffering occurred34 and be informed of the per-
petrators’ identity.35
Solely providing the right to truth is not adequate, however, to fulfill a state’s
obligations, as the Inter-American Commission recognized in Garay Hermosilla 
et al. v. Chile, which concerned the impact of an amnesty on the investigation into
the disappearance of 70 individuals in Chile. In this case, the commission found
that truth commissions and reparations programs are ‘not sufficient to guarantee
respect for the human rights of the petitioners ... as long as they are denied the
right to justice.’36 The commission made similar determinations in cases relating
to the Argentinian37 and Salvadorean38 truth commissions. Here, the commission
reasoned that these institutions did not satisfy the state’s obligations because of
the lack of any legal recourse for victims, the nonjudicial nature of the truth com-
missions, the limitation of their work in identifying the victims and not the per-
petrators and, in the case of the Argentinian truth commission, the inability to
publish the perpetrators’ names or to impose any punishment.
The obligation to provide justice was addressed by the Inter-American Court in
the Barrios Altos case, where an amnesty had been applied to an investigation of
the 1991 massacre of 15 people in the Barrios Altos district of Lima. The Inter-
American Court held that the Peruvian amnesty laws violated Article 1(1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights because ‘they prevented the ... prosecu-
tion and conviction of those responsible.’39 However, in its ruling, the court did
not order that the perpetrators be prosecuted. It held instead that:
the state of Peru should investigate the facts to determine the identity of those respon-
sible for the human rights violations referred to in this judgment, and also publish the
results of this investigation and punish those responsible.40
Therefore, although the court held that the perpetrators should be punished, it
did not order the overturning of the amnesty to allow criminal punishment,
which seems to suggest the possibility of imposing noncriminal sanctions. This
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approach was followed by most of the courts and quasi-judicial bodies, which
consistently ordered or recommended reparations, usually financial compensa-
tions. Increasingly though, some institutions are recommending other forms of
reparations, including erecting memorials or making public apologies.41
Despite finding that amnesty laws violate a victim’s right to a remedy, the courts
have occasionally recognized that ‘in certain circumstances, it may be difficult to
investigate acts which violate an individual’s rights’42 because of political 
instability. Similar recognition is provided by Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which
permits the UN Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, to defer prosecutions for renewable periods of one year in the interests of
peace and security. Recognizing this difficulty could have resulted in international
courts outlining the minimum requirements that transitional justice processes must
fulfill for an amnesty to be acceptable, but this has not occurred to date. This could
be due to reluctance among jurists to risk destabilizing a transition or inhibiting the
freedom of governments to choose their own path through a political transition,
particularly in response to the recent trend for amnesty processes to include mech-
anisms to fulfill the rights of victims to truth and reparations.43
Where courts that hold individuals to account are reluctant to explore the
extent of the legal principles relating to amnesty, this reluctance could imply sim-
ply that they view amnesties as incidental questions to be addressed before they
can consider the merits of the case.44 Therefore, such courts often address
amnesties only in relation to particular events or violations. This is coupled with
a prosecutorial strategy of targeted prosecutions of those who are ‘most responsi-
ble.’ Therefore, to date, most international judgments that discuss the legitimacy
of amnesty laws have focused on the obligations of states to adhere to their com-
mitments under international human rights law, rather than individual criminal
prosecutions. The remainder of this paper will investigate the circumstances
under which international courts could choose to defer to national amnesties.
Should International Courts Respect Some Forms of
Amnesty?
As discussed above, international courts have traditionally been reluctant to
address the differing forms of amnesty, but it is likely that they will eventually have
no choice. The ICC’s investigation into the situation in Uganda will probably 
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provide the most immediate challenge, as although the Ugandan parliament
passed an amendment to the 2000 Amnesty Act45 on 20 April 2006 to exclude the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader, Joseph Kony, and his top commanders from
the amnesty,46 the Ugandan president has subsequently offered assurances to
Kony that he and his comrades would not be prosecuted if they surrendered.47
Furthermore, in addition to confronting pre-existing amnesty laws, transitional
states may in the future consult the ICC when designing mechanisms to address
past human rights violations.48 Such determinations could involve the ICC and
other international courts in assessing the validity of amnesties against several cri-
teria that will be discussed below.
Amnesty and the Pursuit of Justice
Amnesty is frequently described as a denial of justice, but this section will argue
that in certain circumstances amnesty can promote justice, where a broad under-
standing of the term is adopted.
‘In the Interests of Justice’
As discussed previously, the question of whether prosecutions are always ‘in the
interests of justice’ has been disputed by those who believe that in certain situa-
tions attempting prosecutions might cause the violence to continue.49 In such
cases, amnesties could arguably contribute to peace and stability by providing
opportunities for ceasefires and negotiations to occur. This view has received
some recognition in Article 53 of the Rome Statute, which relates to the initiation
of an investigation or prosecution and awards the ICC prosecutor considerable
discretion when deciding whether to proceed, subject to review by the Pre-Trial
Chamber. This article does not explicitly address amnesty laws,50 possibly as a
result of some constructive ambiguity during the negotiating process.51 It does
stipulate, however, that in making his decision, the prosecutor shall foreclose
investigations that ‘would not serve the interests of justice,’ even after having taken
‘into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims.’52 This shows
that ‘despite the tests of severity and the interests of victims being satisfied, the
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interests of justice may “nonetheless’’ act to defeat the satisfaction of these and
other case-specific criteria.’53
Article 53 allows the prosecutor to make a decision that is ‘entirely political,’ in
that ‘he would have to weigh the requirement of peace and reconciliation on the
one hand against the need for justice on the other.’54 In making this decision, the
prosecutor would have to consider the political context, the nature of the amnesty
law itself and whether it was introduced following a transparent decision-making
process where the victims’ views were heard.55 The prosecutor would also have to
consider whether other forms of justice were available. Furthermore, in determin-
ing whether to proceed, the prosecutor must recognize that the needs of individu-
als for justice do not always complement the needs of whole societies for peace. The
prosecutor must therefore balance whether to apply a utilitarian standard by
declining to prosecute where the criminal indictment could result in continued or
increased suffering for a larger number of people than would suffer from the denial
of justice for individuals who were previously marginalized and oppressed. There
is some evidence that the current ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, is pre-
pared to incorporate such political factors when deciding whether to initiate an
investigation. For example, in an address to the UN Security Council he declared:
I am ... required by the Rome Statute to consider whether a prosecution is not in the
interests of justice. In considering this factor I will follow the various national and
international efforts to achieve peace and security, as well as the views of witnesses and
victims of crimes.56
Similarly, at an international conference in September 2005, Moreno-Ocampo
asserted that ‘amnesties are an example of local justice,’ and he called upon acade-
mics to develop standards to integrate the activities of the ICC with ‘other initia-
tives, such as local mechanisms.’ He stated that a flexible approach was necessary
as the ICC ‘cannot prosecute every single perpetrator’ and its temporal jurisdic-
tion prevents it investigating crimes before July 2002, and that to operate effec-
tively, the Court must convince other actors to work closely with it.57 The forms of
‘local justice’ that the ICC prosecutor was anticipating are likely to include
restorative justice processes.
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A Broader Conception of Justice
When considering whether prosecutions are in the interests of justice, it must be
remembered that there are different forms of justice, which have varying legiti-
macy among different communities. Western criminal models focus on the more
retributive elements of justice, whereas many societies in Africa and elsewhere
prefer to rely on more restorative methods.58 These approaches differ, as more ret-
ributive systems focus on the crime and the appropriate punishment while
restorative systems emphasize the harm and the need to repair relationships.
Minow describes the aim of restorative justice as ‘to repair the injustice, to make
up for it, and to effect corrective changes in the record, in relationships and in
future behavior.’59 This shows that the objectives of restorative justice are both
backward looking, in addressing past crimes, and forward looking, in seeking to
contribute to the establishment of a more equal and harmonious society.60 To
achieve its goals, a restorative justice process must take a holistic approach to
crimes by bringing together victims, offenders and representatives of their respec-
tive communities.61 Victims must be given a central role in which they can
describe their suffering, have their pain acknowledged and receive reparations for
the harm they have endured. Offenders, whilst being encouraged to take responsi-
bility for their actions, should be treated with respect. The involvement of repre-
sentatives of the communities to which the victims and offenders belong is signif-
icant, particularly in transitional societies, as restorative justice processes
recognize that crime does not simply affect individuals, but society as a whole,
with individual members of different communities perpetrating different acts that
reflect upon the entire community.62 Restorative approaches can be suitable
where formal Western-style retributive prosecutions are not possible because of
practical and political constraints, or where restorative mechanisms are the pre-
ferred approach to justice, which is the case in many societies in Africa and else-
where.
To date, there have been several examples where amnesty laws have been intro-
duced in conjunction with community-based justice processes. For example, the
Acholi people of northern Uganda, who have suffered greatly from the acts of the
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LRA, use their traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, known as nyouo tong
gweno and mato oput to reintegrate former combatants into society. These tradi-
tional processes are currently being debated for codification and the ICC prosecu-
tor has expressed his intention to ‘integrate the dialogue for peace, the ICC and
traditional justice and reconciliation processes.’63 In this way, amnesty accompa-
nied by traditional community-based justice mechanisms can co-exist with 
international prosecutions for those who are ‘most responsible.’ Furthermore,
amnesty could be used in conjunction with restorative justice mechanisms to
encourage perpetrators to participate without inculpating themselves. This was
the approach followed by the South African TRC.64
Although punishment is not the objective of restorative justice, it often results in
alternative forms of punishment such as public identification, community service,
financial contribution to compensation for victims or public apologies being
agreed to by the participants. Such measures would help to fulfill the victims’ rights
to reparations. In these instances, amnesty could be conditional on the offenders’
complying with the penalties imposed by the restorative justice mechanism and
could therefore work as an enforcement mechanism and a way of reassuring vic-
tims of the genuineness of the process. The flexibility of the restorative justice
approach to punishment offers the opportunity for amnesty to be reconciled with
a justice process in which the needs of victims are acknowledged. Perpetrators
might also have to perform appropriate cultural or religious rituals to show their
desire to change and become reintegrated into society.65 This could enable the
amnesty to be granted in a context of societal forgiveness and reconciliation.
In deciding whether to respect a restorative justice approach that offers perpetra-
tors the possibility of amnesty, international courts must consider whether the
process has been introduced in good faith to foster reconciliation, to promote truth,
to provide victims with a forum to reveal their suffering and receive acknowledge-
ment and to offer reparations to victims. International courts could complement
the work of restorative justice processes by threatening former leaders who have
used their position to embezzle funds and impoverish the country with prosecution
if they failed to transfer their wealth to reparations programs for victims.66
Only the ‘Most Responsible’
The international and hybrid tribunals focus their prosecutorial resources on
those who are deemed ‘most responsible.’ This category of individuals is usually
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considered to include the ‘planners, leaders and persons who committed the most
serious crimes,’67 and could comprise the ‘political, administrative and military
leadership.’ It is argued that ‘any level of participation by any such persons is thus
sufficient to bring them within the category of those to be prosecuted.’68 This is
reflected in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY, which require the
tribunal:
in reviewing and confirming any new indictments, to ensure that any such indict-
ments concentrate on the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for
crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.69
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) follows a similar pros-
ecutorial policy to comply with the UN Security Council’s completion strategy for
the tribunal.70
More recently, the requirement that only those persons ‘who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law’ be prose-
cuted has been codified in the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone
(SCSL).71 The UN Secretary General has interpreted the term ‘greatest responsi-
bility’ as not limiting personal jurisdiction to political and military leaders by
forming an element of the crime that must be proven, but rather as describing a
prosecutorial strategy.72 However, given the limited resources of the SCSL, it is
unlikely that lower-level offenders will be indicted. In the case of South Africa,
however, these offenders fell within the jurisdiction of the TRC, which also inves-
tigated the most serious crimes.73 Similar to the SCSL, the personal jurisdiction of
the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers has been limited, according to the law
establishing them, to ‘senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea’ and those who
were ‘most responsible’ for the crimes falling within the temporal and subject-
matter jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers.74 This wording clearly reveals
the targets of investigations.75
67 Stahn, supra n 16 at 707.
68 Hassan B. Jallow, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice,’ Journal of
International Criminal Justice 3(1) (2005): 152.
69 ICTY, ‘Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ 29 March 2006, r 28(A), available at http://www.un.
org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm (accessed 15 February 2007).
70 Jallow, supra n 68 at 150.
71 SCSLSt. art. 1.
72 Cited in Abdul Tejan-Cole, ‘The Complementary and Conflicting Relationships between the Special
Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,’ Yale Human Rights and
Development Law Journal 6 (2003): 147–8.
73 Ibid, 148–9.
74 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 2001 (Cambodia),
art. 1.
75 Simon M. Meisenberg, ‘The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers,’ BOFAXE, (Institute for
International Law of Peace and Humanitarian Law, Ruhr-University Bochum, November 2004),
available at http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ifhv/publications/bofaxe/x287E.pdf (accessed 15
February 2007).
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The ICC is limited to bringing charges only against perpetrators of ‘the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’76 This 
limitation to the court’s jurisdiction is bolstered by admissibility requirements in
Article 17 that state that the court shall find a case inadmissible where it ‘is not of
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.’ The Office of the
Prosecutor has interpreted this as a requirement to ‘focus its investigative and
prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility,
such as the leaders of the state or organization allegedly responsible for those
crimes.’77 It is not expected that lower-ranking combatants will appear before this
court; instead, it is anticipated that they will be dealt with within the state where
the crimes occurred.
In recent years, transitional states have developed increasingly intricate
processes to treat offenders differently, depending on their perceived level of
responsibility. For example, in Timor Leste, the UN Transitional Administration
established a range of transitional justice mechanisms, including courts, a truth
commission and a community reconciliation process (CRP). Offenders were
assigned to an institution depending on the crimes that they had committed,
with those individuals responsible for serious crimes such as murder, rape and
torture facing prosecution, and individuals who had committed minor offences
being dealt with by the CRP. Serious crimes were also investigated by the truth
commission. Similarly, in Rwanda, following advice from international legal and
policy experts,78 the Rwandan National Assembly adopted legislation that estab-
lished categories of genocide suspects based on their level of responsibility.79
This system combines prosecutions for higher-level offenders with nonpenal
sanctions for lower-level offenders, although it appears that the legislation is
intended to ensure that the majority of offenders will face some form of penal
sanction.
The policy of targeted prosecutions at the international level for those who are
‘most responsible’ can complement national amnesties as it assumes that the low-
level offenders will be dealt with at the national level, through either prosecutions
or an amnesty in conjunction with mechanisms such as lustration and truth com-
missions to hold individuals responsible without prosecuting them. A more flexi-
ble approach involving alternative mechanisms could provide a more realistic
response to ‘the varying levels of culpability amongst those who have committed
atrocities,’ with those who were obeying orders or acting under duress receiving
more lenient treatment.80
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Truth Commissions as an Alternative to Formal Justice
According to the Amnesty Law Database, since the 1980s, 33 amnesty processes
have been related to truth commissions,81 with the bulk of these commissions
occurring after the South African TRC began operating. Truth commissions and
amnesties can be related to one another in several ways. Firstly, an amnesty can be
introduced before the establishment of a truth commission. This was the case in
Chile, where the military junta had promulgated an amnesty law in 1978 to shield
members of the armed forces from prosecution for the serious crimes that they
had committed during the ‘dirty war.’ When a democratic government subse-
quently came to power in 1990, it found that, for several reasons, the amnesty was
impossible to repeal, which led the president, Patricio Aylwin, to constitute a truth
commission to achieve ‘justice inasmuch as was possible.’82 Secondly, an amnesty
can be introduced following a truth commission, as occurred in El Salvador. Here,
the truth commission named individual perpetrators who were linked to the gov-
ernment, causing the government to respond by enacting an amnesty to protect
those mentioned in the report.83 Finally, an amnesty can be introduced in con-
junction with a truth commission. This could mean either two independent
mechanisms that are introduced simultaneously, such as occurred under the 1999
Lomé Accord that aimed to end the conflict in Sierra Leone84 or a truth commis-
sion that has the power to grant amnesty. It is this latter relationship between the
two forms of transitional justice that has sparked the most debate in recent years,
following the South African TRC. Its appeal is based on two beliefs: that truth
commissions make a positive contribution to reconciliation due to their more vic-
tim-centered nature and greater success in uncovering the truth about past events
in comparison to prosecutions; and that providing amnesty encourages the
involvement of the perpetrators, thereby contributing to a more balanced histori-
cal account of past events than would be the case if only the stories of victims were
heard.
For an international court to consider a truth commission that offers amnesty
in exchange for truth to be an adequate alternative to formal justice, there are a
number of key requirements, which have been identified from the experience of
the commissions that have operated to date. Firstly, the truth commission must be
a separate institution created formally by law, rather than established through
executive policy, as ‘if the government were to create the commission, the life and
work of the commission would be at the whim of the government.’85 Secondly, the
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truth commission should pursue ‘a restorative conception of justice that involves
revealing the truth, repairing victim’s harm and promoting reconciliation.’86
Thirdly, the commissioners who are appointed should be ‘perceived as above 
politics,’87 so that the truth commission is not viewed as biased. Fourthly, the
mandate of the truth commission should be broad enough ‘to provide a more
complete picture of the past.’88 It is not clear, however, whether under interna-
tional law a truth commission needs to investigate every violation that occurred or
whether it could select representative cases to reconcile limited resources with the
need to present a clear history. Where decisions are made to focus on particular
events rather than all incidents, the factors influencing the decision should be
transparent.
Once a truth commission has been established, amnesties should be granted
individually to encourage each applicant to fulfill the necessary conditions, par-
ticularly the requirement to tell the truth. For those individuals who fail to adhere
to the conditions, prosecutions should be pursued. Even where amnesty is grant-
ed, truth commissions should name individuals responsible for violations. To
avoid conflict with the applicant’s right to due process, any allegations should be
substantiated by the commission and the named individual should be given the
opportunity to reply either by an oral statement before the commission or in a
written submission to be included in the ‘commission’s file.’89 Publishing names is
important: although amnesties result in the perpetrators evading criminal sanc-
tions, naming names exposes the truth and holds perpetrators accountable for
their actions.90 By identifying individual perpetrators in publicized sessions or in
the commission’s report, there is the possibility that they will face some ‘mental
anguish in owning up to what one has been capable of.’91 Furthermore, they may
have to carry ‘the burden of potential or real social ostracism,’ which could be a
form of punishment.92 However, truth commissions should not impose penal
sentences as they do not require the same standards of proof or evidence as
courts.93 Sarkin has advocated, however, in his study of the Amnesty Committee
of the South African TRC, that legal standards such as the use of precedent should
be employed to ensure that amnesty is granted fairly, and that ‘procedures are
being consistently applied to all.’94
A victim’s right to a remedy could be fulfilled by a truth commission, which
pursues a restorative conception of justice, and treating offenders leniently may
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reduce the risk of renewed hostilities. These benefits could be undermined,
however, if the ICC prosecutor ‘decided that perpetrators remained susceptible to
international prosecution even when they have received an amnesty from a truth
commission.’95 It could even dissuade perpetrators from participating in the truth
commission for fear of incriminating themselves by their own testimony. Roche
argues instead that it would be more beneficial for international prosecutors:
to adopt a cooperative approach, and select cases to prosecute from the group of indi-
viduals who have failed to apply for amnesty, or those whose amnesty applications
have been rejected.96
This would make amnesties more valuable and offenders more inclined to apply
for one. It could also ‘enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy’ of the internation-
al court, which ‘would have a principled basis on which to allocate its scarce pros-
ecutorial resources.’97
Democratic Approval
For amnesties to be acceptable to international courts they should have democra-
tic approval, as without it, an amnesty would be unlikely to ‘serve the security and
social-rehabilitation requirements of the transitional society.’98 These require-
ments do not necessarily mirror those of international human rights law, as the
former are focused on the community, whereas the latter are based on the rights
of individuals.
Democratic approval can be expressed in various ways including through nego-
tiated settlements involving representatives of all the parties to the conflict or
transition process and international observers. Here, it is particularly important
that representatives of the new transitional regime, especially if democratically
elected, are present in order to enhance the legitimacy of the agreement.99 If none
of the representatives of any of the parties are elected, the process will have only
limited democratic legitimacy, as although the spokespersons of all the main com-
munities may participate in the negotiations, it is sometimes unclear whether
those individuals themselves have a legitimate right to speak on behalf of others.
The situation can be similarly compromised for amnesty laws that are approved
by politicians who were not elected, or achieved their position following rigged
elections.
An amnesty law would have greater legitimacy if it was approved by democratically
elected politicians and there was widespread public consultation, either through an
orchestrated consultation program,100 an election-campaign promise to introduce an
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amnesty101 or a referendum, either specifically on the amnesty law or on a new consti-
tution that contains amnesty provisions.102 However, this can pose difficulties for
transitional regimes as the complex questions concerning the timing and methods of
consultation will clearly depend on the conditions within each transitional state,
including the quality of the communication infrastructure and the extent of security
concerns, particularly where public involvement during delicate negotiations could
destabilize the process by undermining the mandate of the negotiators. However, con-
sultations should, in principle, be as full and inclusive as circumstances permit.
Even where an amnesty law is approved by a referendum, difficulties could arise.
For example, simple majority support will not be appropriate where minority
groups were the targets of oppression.103 Furthermore, after a referendum, it may
be unclear whether the result truly reflects the will of the populace. For example,
the Uruguayan referendum, where the population voted in favor of the amnesty
law, is often lauded as an example of democratic approval. But it has been con-
tended that the democratic politicians were intimidated by the still powerful army,
that the Supreme Court disqualified many signatures from the petition that led to
the referendum and that there were allegations of intimidation of voters by the
police.104 If these allegations are true, they undermine the extent of true democra-
tic approval that the amnesty law received. This does not devalue the referendum
process entirely however, as referendums, by inspiring public debate on the
amnesty, can help it to foster reconciliation.
Despite all these difficulties, if an international court is faced with an amnesty that
has democratic approval and widespread support among the population expressed
through a referendum, it would be difficult for the court to intervene to conduct
investigations without encountering both political and practical problems.
Politically, the decision by a prosecutor to investigate in contravention of the clearly
expressed view of the government and its people would be seen as an intrusion
upon the state sovereignty of that country and possibly an imposition of culturally
inappropriate processes and values. On a practical level, any international court
wishing to prosecute individuals who had been granted amnesty would benefit from
the support of the state in obtaining evidence and witnesses and arresting the
accused, which would be unlikely to be granted if the investigation was unpopular.
Such decisions will have to be made by international courts on a case-by-case basis.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that to date, international courts have been reluctant to rec-
ognize national amnesty laws; instead, they have frequently condemned them as
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violating the victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparations. However, such 
condemnations have focused on automatic, unconditional amnesties that aimed
to prevent investigations into human rights violations, as international courts
have yet to consider more individualized, conditional amnesties that aim to pro-
mote peace and reconciliation.
This paper has argued that where amnesty is a necessary compromise to
encourage combatants to disarm or dictators to transfer power to democratically
elected leaders, it could be beneficial to both international courts and transitional
states to cooperate in promoting victims’ rights. In these instances, the work of the
international courts could reinforce domestic institutions such as truth commis-
sions by targeting only those individuals who are ‘most responsible’ or who have
failed to fulfill the conditions attached to the amnesty process. It has been argued
that such a prosecutorial strategy would both encourage combatants to partici-
pate in the amnesty process and enhance the legitimacy and transparency of the
international courts, whilst making more effective use of limited resources.
The author has suggested criteria upon which courts could base their decisions
on whether to intervene in domestic amnesty processes.
1. Amnesty should have democratic legitimacy:
Amnesties must be introduced with democratic approval following, as far as pos-
sible, widespread public consultation involving all stakeholder groups in the soci-
ety concerned. Such assessments can depend on the legitimacy of the negotiators
to the peace treaty, the fairness by which political representatives were appointed
to the legislature or whether intimidation was used during a referendum cam-
paign. Such considerations would further need to take into account the infra-
structure in place when the amnesty was introduced to determine, in the absence
of a referendum, whether it would have been possible to conduct a fair public vote
on the amnesty.
2. Amnesty should represent a genuine desire to promote peace and reconcilia-
tion:
The amnesty law must be aimed at genuinely promoting peace and reconciliation,
rather than simply providing immunity for certain groups of individuals. Clearly,
this is a wide-ranging criterion that could encompass the scope of the amnesty law
itself, the resources that are contributed to its implementation and whether the
amnesty is part of an overarching program of institutional reform.
3. Amnesty should be limited in scope:
The provisions of the amnesty law itself should be as limited as possible. For
example, those who are ‘most responsible’ could be excluded or the most serious
crimes could be exempted from the amnesty. Alternatively, the amnesty could only
apply to members of particular organizations who agree to engage with democra-
tic and peaceful systems of government. Governmental decisions on how far to
restrict domestic prosecutions may be constrained by many factors, including: the
relative strength of the various political players or armed forces in the transition;
the resources available for complex and expensive prosecutions; the number of
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perpetrators involved; and, where appropriate, the need to cooperate with 
international tribunals.
4. Amnesty must be conditional:
The application of an amnesty can be further limited by requiring that recipients
adhere to conditions such as revealing the truth in exchange for amnesty, or show-
ing remorse for their previous actions either through public apologies or by
demonstrable actions such as community service and surrendering weapons. The
conditions could be elements of a stand-alone amnesty process or they could be
implemented by other transitional justice mechanisms that accompany the
amnesty, such as truth commissions or community-based justice processes. These
mechanisms should aim to disclose as much truth as possible and could entail
some noncriminal sanctions for the perpetrators, such as vetting. Conditional
amnesties should be individualized, and the institutions that determine whether
the conditions have been met must be independent and representative of the pop-
ulation. For those individuals who fail to comply, prosecution should be pursued.
5. Amnesty must be accompanied by reparations:
Amnesties should be accompanied by reparations programs that provide com-
pensation for victims and their families, whilst also taking measures to memorial-
ize the past and prevent similar violations recurring, which could include lustra-
tion or vetting programs. Clearly, determining whether appropriate remedies have
been made available to the victims can be a complicated process due to the diverse
and changing nature of the victims’ views and the resource constraints that con-
strict the ability of a transitional government to act, particularly where repara-
tions need to be balanced against promoting development within the country.
Furthermore, many of the non-monetary forms of reparations can be difficult to
offer immediately. For example, providing victims with medical and psychologi-
cal care may first entail training professionals to fulfill this role and building insti-
tutions such as hospitals where the care can be provided – all of which can be
expensive for transitional states. Therefore, attempts to evaluate whether appro-
priate alternative remedies have been made available to victims should consider
whether the forms of reparations that are possible to grant early on in a transition,
such as instituting a national day of commemoration, are pursued. Furthermore,
consideration should be given to whether the state has acted to fulfill its duty to
investigate by, inter alia, preserving archives relating to the transition, investigat-
ing disappearances and instituting truth-recovery mechanisms. In addition, the
extent to which the government consulted the victims when establishing alterna-
tive remedies and instituted policies to encourage their participation should be
evaluated.
While it is preferable that perpetrators of heinous crimes are brought to justice,
often, threatening to indict combatants or members of dictatorial regimes can
prolong violence and lead to further human rights violations being committed.
Therefore, in such instances, the decision to introduce an individualized, condi-
tional amnesty law in order to achieve peace may be a reasonable response to a
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complex situation. Where this is the case, it is important that international courts
adopt a pragmatic approach where each amnesty will be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. To date, this has not occurred as international courts have faced only
blanket amnesties, but this overview of the potential criteria on which interna-
tional courts could base their decisions is particularly timely as it is likely that, as
states become more innovative in their approaches to transitional justice, the
courts will no longer be able to make sweeping statements condemning amnesty
laws. Instead, they will have to rule on specific provisions within the amnesties
themselves, many of which will involve political decisions.
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